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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE

PLAINTIFF

AND

DEFENDANTS

ENTERED

INTO

AN

ORAL

AGREEMENT TO SELL THE 1986 KENWORTH TRACTOR TO DEFENDANT
KROGMAN.
II.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING

THAT THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT BARRED BY UTAH'S
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
III. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OR SIGNIFICANT
Section 25-5.4.
Certain agreements void unless
written and signed. The following agreements are void
unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the making of the
agreement;
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default,
or miscarriage of another.

Section 25-5-8. Right to specific performance not
affected.
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be
construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the
specific performance of agreements in case of part
performance thereof.
Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant
to Rule
58A;
in granting
or
refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its actions.
Requests for
findings are not necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. The finds of a master, to the extent
that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the
findings of the court.
It will be sufficient if the
findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally
and recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings
on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the
ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rule
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based
on more than one ground.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
agreement

On

February

between

15,

1991,

Plaintiff
2

prior

Donohue

to
and

the

oral

Defendant

Krogman, Plaintiff Donohue entered into a written lease
agreement with Mr. Mouille, d/b/a U.S. Load Services, for
the

lease of

a 1986 Kenworth Truck.

(Appellant's

Addendum "D").
2. That lease agreement required Mr. Mouille to pay
$1,000.00 per month to Associates Commercial Corporation
directly and to pay Plaintiff Donohue $500.00 per month.
(Appellant's Addendum "D", Paragraph 2 ) .
3.

Defendant Krogman was not a party to said

Agreement, did not execute said Agreement, and never saw
the written Agreement.

(Transcript, p. 163; Defendant

Krogmanfs Deposition, p. 21-23)

(Appellee's Addendum

"A").
4.
Donohue

Mr. Mouille leased the truck from Plaintiff
until

December

of

1991, when

he

informed

Plaintiff Donohue that he was closing down U.S. Load
Services
5.

(Transcript, p. 93).
In December of 1991, Plaintiff Donohue told Mr.

Mouille that he was not in the financial position to pay
for the remaining 17-18 months payments on the truck and

3

that

he would

suggested.
6.
Krogman

consider

any

option

that Mr.

Mouille

(Transcript, p. 93).

Consequently, Mr. Mouille contacted Defendant
about

purchasing

Plaintiff

Donohue T s

truck.

meeting

between

(Transcript, p. 94).
7.

The

parties

scheduled

a

Plaintiff Donohue, Defendant Krogman and Mr. Mouille at
Mr. Mouille's parents' house.
8.

The meeting took place at the very first part of

January of 1992.
9.

(Transcript, p. 9 5 ) .

(Transcript, p. 95).

The sole purpose of the meeting was to discuss

the possibility of Defendant Krogman purchasing Plaintiff
Donohue's truck.
10.

During

(Transcript, pp. 95-96).
the meeting, Plaintiff

Donohue

and

Defendant Krogman entered into a verbal agreement, under
which, Defendant Krogman agreed to take over the truck as
of

the

15th

of

January,

payments on the truck.

and

to make

all

remaining

(Transcript, pp. 96 & 153). 1

I

On direct examination, Mr. Mouille testified that during the
meeting at his parents' house the following was said and
understood by the parties:
4

11. The parties agreed that once Defendant Krogman
paid off the truck, Plaintiff Donohue would give him the
title to the truck.
12.

At

(Transcript, p. 104).

the meeting,

Plaintiff

Donohue

never

addressed the $500.00 monthly payment made by Mr. Mouille
to Plaintiff Donohue under the 1991 lease agreement.
(Transcript, p. 97). 2
13.

The terms of the contract were as follows:

Defendant Krogman would make the remaining $1,000.00
monthly payments to Associates through Mr. Mouille, who

"Q. (By Mr. Skeen). Tell me, as near as you
can recall, who said what.
A.
Mr. Krogman was just acknowledging the
discussion that John Donohue and we were
having in front of Vern. We would have made
this
verbal,
gentlemen's
agreement.
Consequently, the only function that the deal
was, that Vern Krogman was going to take over
the truck as of the 15th of January. He would
have had to pay a half payment and then every
remaining payment." (Transcript, p. 96).
At

trial,

Mr.

Mouille

gave

the

following

testimony:

Q. During that meeting, did Mr. Donohue ever say, well,
wait a minute, what about my additional 500 per month you
owe me? Ever raise that as an issue?
A. No. Never did." (Transcript, p. 97).
5

was Plaintiff Krogman's agent.
154-155). 3

(Transcript, pp. 97 &

Once the final installment was made on the

Kenworth, Plaintiff Donohue would turn the title over to
Defendant Krogman.
14.

(Transcript, p, 156).

Defendant Krogman took possession of the truck

on January 3, 1992, and ran the truck until December 21,
1992.

(Transcript, pp. 156-157).

3

Mr. Mouille testified that pursuant to the meeting at his
parents' house, the additional terms of the oral agreement
between the Plaintiff and Defendant were to be as follows:
"Q. (By Mr. Skeen) Tell me, as near as you
can recall, who said what.
A. . . . [T]he only two requests made by John
Donohue was that the truck had to be — remain
under my control because John didn't know
Vern's address or his residence.
And the
other request, that I had to make sure the
payment was made through my company since
deducted out of the settlement was those two
conditions were met. That was requirement.
Q. Now, when you say these two conditions and
you were to be in control, and payments were
to be made through you?
A. Right.
Q. Those were at the request of Donohue, were
they not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q.
Because Mr. Krogman didn't care who
collected the money?
A. Mr. Krogman didn't care, but this was the
only requirement, Mr. Krogman agreed to go
along with it." (Transcript, pp. 96-97).
6

15.

During

the

period

of

purchase,

Defendant

Krogman made payments on the truck totalling $17,263.29
together

with

all

repairs,

maintenance,

licensing,

insurance, and all other necessities required by the
truck, satisfying the terms of the oral agreement to
purchase the 1986 Kenworth truck from Plaintiff Donohue.
(Transcript, pp. 153, 156 & 164).
16.

Pursuant

Plaintiff

Donohue

to
and

the

oral

Defendant

agreement
Krogman,

between
Plaintiff

Donohue f s and Mr. Mouillefs attorney, John K. Rice, was
contacted about drafting a separate written agreement
between

Plaintiff

Donohue

and

Defendant

Krogman.

Attorney Rice drew up a written

agreement

(Transcript Supplement, p. 4 ) .
17.

memorializing
Donohue

and

the

oral

Defendant

agreement
Krogman

on

between
March

Plaintiff
30,

1992.

(Transcript Supplement, p. 7 ) .
18.

Prior to drafting the agreement, Mr. Rice spoke

to both Mr. Mouille and Defendant Krogman regarding the
agreement.

(Transcript Supplement, p. 6 ) .

7

19.
Plaintiff
Donohue

Mr. Rice then discussed the agreement with
Donohue
was

and that, at that

willing

to

enter

into

time, Plaintiff
the

agreement.

(Transcript Supplement, p. 6 ) .
20.

Mr. Rice also drew up a separate agreement

between Plaintiff Donohue and Mr. Mouille, d/b/a Haul-AWay Transport, Inc., under which, Mr. Mouille remained
obligated to pay Plaintiff Donohue $9,500 which he owed
under

the

February

15,

1991,

lease

agreement.

(Transcript Supplement, pp. 5 & 11).
21.

Mr. Rice testified that Mr. Mouille agreed to

remain solely liable to pay Mr. Donohue the $500.00 per
month and that the $9,500 debt owed by Mr. Mouille to Mr.
Donohue would not affect whether Defendant Krogman would
get the title to the truck once he paid off Associates.
(Transcript Supplement, p. 5 ) .
22.
Donohue,

Contrary to the testimony given by Plaintiff
Mr.

Rice

testified

that

he

conversed

with

Plaintiff Donohue regarding the continued amount owed by
Mr. Mouille.

(Transcript Supplement, pp. 6 & 11).

8

23.

From January of 1992, until December of 1993,

Mr. Mouille withheld $1,000.00 per month from the monies
owed by him to Defendant Krogman and then paid $1,000.00
directly
contract.
24.
Mr.

to

Associates

pursuant

to

the

installment

(Transcript, p. 97).
In February, 1993, Defendant Krogman contacted

Mouille

and

asked

for

a

payoff

on

the

truck.

(Transcript, p. 105).
25.

Mr. Mouille then called Plaintiff

requesting the same information.
26.

Plaintiff

Donohue

Donohue,

(Transcript, p. 105).
called

Associates

and

reported to Mr. Mouille that the sum of $5,763.29 was
owing on the truck.
27.

(Transcript, p. 158).

After Mr. Mouille contacted Defendant Krogman

and advised him of the payoff figure, Defendant Krogman
forwarded a cashier's check to Mr. Mouille, d/b/a HaulA-Way

Transport,

Inc.,

for

payment

outstanding balance on the truck.

in

full

of

the

(Transcript, p. 105 &

158).
28.
the

truck

Mr. Mouille did not use the money to pay off
at

that

time

but
9

continued

to

make

the

$1,000.00 monthly payments on the truck during the months
of February through June, 1993, from the proceeds of the
cashier's check.
29.

(Transcript, pp. 105-106).

In July, 1993, Mr. Mouille contacted Plaintiff

Donohue and told Plaintiff Donohue that he was prepared
to make the last payment on the truck to Associates.
(Transcript, pp. 106-107).
30.

He reminded Plaintiff Donohue that he would

need the Kenworth title to transfer to Defendant Krogman.
(Transcript, p. 107).
31.
off

Plaintiff Donohue obtained the $1,065.00 pay-

figure

from

Associates

and

called

informing him of the pay-off figure.

Mr. Mouille,
(Transcript, p

107).
32. When Mr. Mouille told Plaintiff Donohue that he
had the money to pay off the truck to release the title
to Defendant Krogman, Plaintiff Donohue, for the first
time, told Mr. Mouille that he would not transfer the
title to Defendant Krogman as Mr. Mouille still owed
Plaintiff Donohue money.

(Transcript, p. 107).

10

33.
truck

was

Mr. Mouille advised the Plaintiff that the
not

negotiable

Defendant Krogman.
34.

and

that

it

belonged

to

(Transcript, p. 107).

Based upon Plaintiff Donohuefs representation

that he would not tender the title of the truck to
Defendant Krogman, Mr. Mouille refused to pay the last
installment, in the sum of $1,065.00, to Associates.
Transcript, p. 77).
35.

In, or before, September,

1993, Defendant

Krogman called Plaintiff Donohue and demanded the title
to the truck, pursuant to the contract.

(Transcript, p.

159).
36.

At that time, Plaintiff Donohue refused to

tender the title to Defendant Krogman and demanded return
of the Kenworth truck.

(Transcript, p. 159).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court correctly found that an oral
agreement existed between the parties to sell the 1986
Kenworth truck to Defendant Krogman.

Furthermore, the

District Court's four findings of fact regarding the
existence

of

an

oral

contract
11

are

supported

by

substantial and competent evidence that a meeting of the
minds occurred between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
Moreover, manifestations of assent between the parties,
that

were

contract,

in
will

themselves
not

sufficient

prevent

the

to

conclude

contract's

a

operation

simply because the parties also manifested an intent to
prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof.
The oral agreement clearly is not barred by Utah's
Statute of Frauds.
that

Defendant

The trial court specifically found

Krogman

performed

his

part

of

the

agreement in reliance on the parties' agreement.
Furthermore, the Record conclusively shows that the oral
agreement could have been performed within one year and
that Defendant Krogman was not answering a debt for Mr.
Mouille or Plaintiff Donohue.
Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed the
Plaintiff's Complaint and correctly found that an oral
agreement

existed

between

the

parties.

Appellee

respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District
Court's judgment for Appellee.

12

ARGUMENT
I.

THE

DISTRICT

COURT

PROPERLY

FOUND

THAT

THE

PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO A BINDING
ORAL CONTRACT TO SELL THE 1986 KENWORTH TRUCK TO

DEFENDANT KROGMAN.
Standard

A.

of

Review

On appeal, the decision of the trial court is
Oberhansly

entitled to a presumption of validity.
Earl,
courts

572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977).
are

required

to view

the

v.

Utah appellate

evidence

and

any

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
sustaining the decision. Id. ; see

also

Cutler

v.

Bowen,

543 P. 2d 1349 (Utah 1975). Furthermore, appellate courts
will not overturn a trial court's factual findings when
such findings are supported by substantial and competent
Cambelt

evidence.

Int'l

Corp.

1242 (Utah 1987).; see also

v.

Dalton,

745 P.2d 1239,

Von Hake v. Thomas,

766, 769 (Utah 1985).

Substantial

705 P.2d

evidence

is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Johnson-Bowles
Division

of

1992), cert,

Securities,
denied,

v.

829 P.2d 101, 107 (Utah App.
843 P.2d 516, quoting Idaho
13

State

Ins.

Fund v.

(1985).

Hunnicutt,

110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930

The burden on an appellant in challenging the

trial court's factual findings is heavy.
Corp.,

Cambelt

Int'l

745 P.2d at 1242. Thus, findings of fact, whether

based upon oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.

UT R. CIV. P. 52(a).

Therefore, in reviewing the evidence presented at
trial,

this

Court

must

view

the

evidence

and

any

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
sustain the District Court's decision.
Court

heard

clearly

substantial

supported

its

and

competent

factual

The District
evidence

findings

and

that
legal

conclusion that a contract existed between the Plaintiff

14

and

the

Defendant.4

The

District

Court's

decision

therefore must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.

B.

Trial

Court's Opportunity to Judge the
Credibility
of Witnesses

It is a function of the judge, as the trier of fact,
upon hearing oral testimony, to decide which evidence is
more credible regarding the issues at trial.
Coatesr

735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987).

Lemon

v.

Moreover, a trial

court's findings of the ultimate facts implicitly reflect
consideration of the believability

of the witnesses'

testimony. McKlnstray

628 P. 2d 1286 (Utah

1981).

Appellate

v. McKinstrayf
courts may

not

disturb

judge's findings unless clearly erroneous.

the
Lemon,

trial
735

P.2d at 60.

4

Plaintiff's bald assertion that the District Court's factual
finding of the existence of an oral contract between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant is contrary to the evidence
presented at trial. Whether a contract exists between
parties is a question of law reviewed for correctness, John
Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment,
Inc.,
876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah
App. 1994).
The District Court's factual findings that an
oral contract existed were based on the clear and definite
testimony of Mr. Mouille, the Defendant, and Mr. Rice. Thus,
the District Court's factual findings cannot be overturned
unless clearly erroneous.
15

The trial court judge heard testimony from numerous
witnesses

and

had

the

opportunity

credibility of the witnesses.

to

judge

Both Mr. Mouille

the
and

Defendant Krogman gave clear, unequivocal, and definite
testimony of the existence of an oral agreement between
the Plaintiff and the Defendant for the purchase of the
1986 Kenworth truck.

Moreover, Mr. Rice's testimony

confirmed that Plaintiff Donohue understood the terms of
the contract and assented to the terms.
Appellant tenuously argues that Defendant Krogman f s
testimony was impeached because he failed remember the
exact

date, place, and time of the oral

agreement.5

This argument is merely an attempt to muddle the clearly
5

The evidence presented to the District Court clearly showed
that an oral agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant
arose at the meeting at Mr. Mouille ? s parents' house.
Although several more conversations between the Plaintiff, the
Defendant, and Mr. Mouille occurred at the
offices of Mr. Mouille f s corporation, Haul-A-Way Transport,
Inc., in Bountiful, Utah, (Transcript, p. 98), both the
Defendant and Mr. Mouille maintained that the parties entered
into the oral agreement at Mr. Mouille f s parents1 house. At
subsequent meetings, the Defendant inspected the truck, he and
the Plaintiff talked about the different aspects of the truck,
and the parties discussed the agreement even further.
(Transcript, p. 98).
16

established facts.

Defendant Krogman testified that he

and the Plaintiff discussed the terms of the contract,
including the purchase price of the truck.
p. 156 ) 6 .

(Transcript,

Defendant Krogman further testified that both

parties understood the terms of the contract and that
both parties assented to those terms.
155-156).

(Transcript, pp.

Both Mr. Mouille and Mr. Rice corroborated

Defendant Krogman's testimony regarding the existence of
the oral agreement and its terms.
The District Court Judge, as the trier of fact,
heard

testimony

and decided

which

evidence was more

credible regarding the issues at trial. Furthermore, the
District

Court's

findings

of

the

ultimate

facts

implicitly reflected consideration of the believability
of the witnesses' testimony. Thus, this Court should not

Defendant's testimony is consistent with the District
Court's Finding of Facts: "7. The Court finds that while some
of the specifics of the contract may not have been discussed
in detail between the parties, sufficient terms were discussed
and agreed upon to constitute a contract between the parties."
(Record, pp. 172-173).
17

disturb

the

trial

judge's

findings

unless

clearly

erroneous.
Clear

C.
The

District

Meeting
Court's

of

the Mounds

four

findings

of

fact

regarding the existence of an oral contract are supported
by substantial and competent evidence that a meeting of
the

minds

Defendant.

occurred

between

the

Plaintiff

and

the

It is a basic principle of contract law that

there can be no contract without a meeting of the minds
of the parties which must be spelled out either expressly
or

impliedly

enforcement.
An

with

sufficient

Oberhansly,

"oral contract

definiteness

to

allow

572 P.2d at 1386.
and its terms must be clear,

definite, mutually understood, and established by clear,
unequivocal and definite testimony."

Holmgren

inc.

614

v.

Ballard,

534

P.2d

611,

Brothers,

(Utah

1975).

Moreover, "contractual mutual assent requires assent by
all the parties to the same thing in the same sense so
that their minds meet as to all the terms."
Co.,

v.

A & H Equipment,

Inc.,
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John

Deere

876 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah

App.

1994), quoting Crlsmon

America,

v.

Western

Co.

of

North

742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987).

Here, the Record clearly establishes that the terms
of the oral contract between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant were clear, definite, and mutually understood.
The Defendant, Mr. Mouille, and Mr. Rice gave clear,
unequivocal, and definite testimony regarding the terms
of

the

oral

agreement

and

the

parties1

mutual

understanding of said agreement.
As mentioned above, Mr. Mouille testified that he
leased the truck from the Plaintiff until December of
1991, when he informed the Plaintiff that he was closing
down his business on December 15, 1991. (Transcript, p.
93).

Mr. Mouille then testified that Plaintiff Donohue

told him that he could not afford to pay the remaining
17-18 months payments on the truck, and therefore, Mr.
Mouille approached Defendant Krogman about purchasing the
truck from Plaintiff Donohue.

(Transcript, pp. 93-94).

Mr. Mouille testified that a meeting, between John
Donohue, Vern Krogman and himself,took place at the very
first part of January of 1992 at his parents' house.
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(Transcript, p. 95). Mr. Mouille further testified that
the

sole purpose

of the meeting

purchase of the truck

was to discuss

the

(Transcript, pp. 95-96).

On direct examination, Mr. Mouille testified that
during

the meeting

at his parents1

house, both

the

Plaintiff and the Defendant understood that the Defendant
was

going

to

take

the

truck

and

begin

Associates as of the 15th of January.
96).

payments

to

(Transcript, p.

Mr. Mouille testified that, at Plaintiff Donohuef s

request, the additional terms of the oral agreement were
that the truck had to remain under Mr. Mouille f s control
and that Defendant Krogman had to make every remaining
payment through Mr. Mouille?s company.
96-97).
agreed

(Transcript, pp.

Mr. Mouille testified that Defendant Krogman
to

the

terms

proposed

by

Plaintiff

Donohue.

(Transcript, p. 97).
Defendant Krogman testified that, under the oral
agreement,

Plaintiff

Donohue

required

him

to

pay

$1,000.00 per month to Associates through Mr. Mouille
until the truck was paid off.
Defendant

Krogman

also

(Transcript, p. 154).

testified
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that

the

parties

understood that after he had made all of the payments
through Mr, Mouille to Associates, that Plaintiff Donohue
would give him the title to the truck,

(Transcript, p.

155).
Furthermore,

John

Rice,

DonohueTs

Plaintiff

attorney, testified that, pursuant to the oral agreement
between Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant Krogman, he was
contacted about drafting a separate written document,
memorializing

the

oral

agreement

Donohue and Defendant Krogman.

between

Plaintiff

(Transcript Supplement,

p. 4 ) . Mr. Rice also testified that he drew up a written
agreement memorializing the oral agreement on March 30,
1992.

(Transcript Supplement, p. 7 ) .

Mr. Rice then testified that he spoke to both Mr.
Mouille and Defendant Krogman regarding the agreement
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

(Transcript

Supplement, p. 6). Mr. Rice further testified that he
discussed the agreement with Plaintiff Donohue and that
Plaintiff
agreement.

Donohue

was

willing

to

enter

(Transcript Supplement, p. 6).

into

the

Mr. Rice

concluded his testimony by confirming that Plaintiff
21

Donohue had conversed with Mr. Mouille regarding the
$9,500 debt and that the parties agreed that Mr. Mouille
was to pay the $9,500.

(Transcript Supplement, pp. 5, 7

& 11).
It is interesting to note that Mr. Rice drew up an
entirely separate agreement between the Plaintiff and Mr.
Mouille, under which, Mr. Mouille remained obligated to
pay the Plaintiff $9,500 which he owed the Plaintiff
under the February 15, 1991, lease agreement between the
Plaintiff and Mr. Mouille.
5).

(Transcript Supplement, p.

The fact that Mr. Rice was asked to prepare two

separate documents is substantial and competent evidence
that Plaintiff Donohue intended to enter into, and, in
fact, had already entered into two separate agreements
with Mr. Mouille and Defendant Krogman.
Appellant argues that he had no input in drafting
these documents and that the terms and conditions were
supplied only by Mr. Mouille. This contention is without
merit.

As mentioned

above, Mr. Rice testified

that

Plaintiff Donohue conversed with Mr. Mouille about the
written agreement between Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant
22

Krogman and that he was willing to enter into said
agreement.

(Transcript Supplement, p. 7). Furthermore,

Mr. Rice testified that he conversed with the Plaintiff
regarding the new agreement between the Plaintiff and Mr.
Mouille.

(Transcript Supplement, p. 11). Finally, the

Plaintiff informed Mr. Rice that, pursuant to the new
agreement, Mr. Mouille would remain separately liable for
the $9,500 resulting from the 1991 lease.

(Transcript

Supplement, p. 11).
The District Court therefore properly found that an
oral agreement existed between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant for the purchase of the Kenworth truck. There
was a clear meeting of the minds between the parties
which

was

expressly

definiteness
agreement.

to

understood

require

with

enforcement

of

sufficient
the

oral

All parties knew that Defendant Krogman was

to pay the remaining payments to Associates through Mr.
Mouille and receive title to the truck when the payments
were made. The parties also knew that Mr. Mouille was to
separately pay Plaintiff Donohue $9,500.

Furthermore,

the oral contract and its terms were clear, definite,
23

mutually

understood,

and

established

by

clear,

unequivocal and definite testimony. Finally, the parties
to the contract mutually assented to the same thing in
the same sense so that their minds met as to all the
terms.
D.

Sufficient Manifestations of Assent

Appellant argues that the parties merely negotiated
at the meeting at Mr. Mouille f s parents' house because
the Plaintiff did not manifest a willingness to contract
until the agreement was reduced to writing.

The Supreme

Court of Utah has recognized that "[m]anifestations of
assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a
contract will not be prevented from so operating by the
fact that the parties also manifest

an intention to

prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof."
v.

Savin,

267 U.A.R. 22, 24 (Utah 1995), (citing

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

findings

SacJcler
RESTATEMENT

§27 (1981). The District Court's factual

are consistent with

the testimony

given by

Defendant Krogman, Mr. Mouille, and Mr. Rice that both
Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant Krogman manifested assent
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to contract regarding the sale of the Kenworth truck at
the meeting at Mr. Mouille's parents' house.
Plaintiff Donohue's assent was clearly manifested
by: (1) allowing Defendant Krogman to drive the Kenworth
truck for 16 months; (2) pursuant to Defendant Krogman?s
request, Plaintiff Donohue called Associates for the payoff amount on the truck; (3) Plaintiff Donohue made no
payments to Associates during the term of the contract
between Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant Krogman; (4)
Plaintiff Donohue did not pay any insurance, licensing
fees, taxes, or maintenance on the truck during the
period of the contract; (5) If no agreement existed, why
didn't Plaintiff Donohue demand return of the truck at
the outset?; (6) Finally, why didn't Plaintiff Donohue
sue Mr. Mouille when Mr. Mouille stopped making the
$1,500

per

month

payments

due

under

the

original

agreement if no contract with Defendant Krogman existed?
Plaintiff Donohue sat on his rights, allowing Defendant
Krogman to make all payments to Associates, and then,
only when Defendant Krogman fully performed his part of

25

the

agreement,

did

Plaintiff

Donohue

disavow

the

contract.
Appellant next argues that there must be a clear
meeting of the minds before either a modification or
novation of an existing contract occurs.
Corp.,

v.

Nielson

Appellant

fails

Scott
to

Co.,

See Provo

City

603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979).

recognize

the

existence

of

two

separate contracts; one between the Plaintiff and Mr.
Mouille, and one between the Plaintiff and Defendant
Krogman.
modify

While there must be a meeting of the minds to
an

existing

contract

between

the

original

contracting parties, the modification does not affect an
entirely separate contract between one of the parties and
a third party.
In the present case, the contract between Plaintiff
Donohue

and

requiring

a

arguendo,

as

Defendant
new

Krogman

meeting

appellant

of

was

the

contends,

never

minds.
that

the

modified,
Assuming,
original

agreement between Plaintiff Donohue and Mr. Mouille was
never cancelled.
conduct.

It was clearly modified by the parties'

Although not modified in writing, the original
26

agreement would still be enforceable outside of Utah's
Statute

of

Frauds

due

to

the

doctrine

of

partial

performance as discussed below.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE ORAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT BARRED BY UTAH'S
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
A.

Standard

of

Review

Factual Findings are upheld unless clearly erroneous
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Zions

First

Nat.

Bank v.

Nat.

Am. Title

Ins.,

749 P.2d

651, 653 (Utah 1988). Whether a contract exists between
parties is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
John Deere Co.,

876 P.2d at 883.
B

*

Statute

of

Frauds

Utah's Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-4 U.C.A. (1953),
as amended, bars both oral agreements where, by their
terms, cannot be performed within one year and oral
agreements to answer for the debts of another. (Emphasis
added). Notwithstanding Utah's Statute of Frauds, courts
enforce oral agreements where one party has performed in
reliance on the agreement.

Martin v.
27

Scholl,

678 P.2d

274, 275 (Utah 1983); see
Frauds,

§ 399.

also

73 Am. Jur., Statute

of

Furthermore, § 25-5-8 U.C.A. (1953) of

the Utah Statute of Frauds provides: "Nothing in this
chapter

contained

shall be

construed

to

abridge

the

powers of courts to compel the specific performance of
agreements in case of part performance thereof." Martin,
678 P.2d at 275, quoting § 25-5-8 U.C.A. (1953).
The Supreme Court of Utah outlined the following
standard of sufficient part performance:
First, the oral contract and its terms must
be clear and definite; second the acts done in
performance on the contract must be equally
clear and definite; and third, the acts must
be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in
reliance must be such that (a) they would not
have been performed had the contract not
existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the
part of the promisor would result in fraud on
the performer who relied, since damages would
be inadequate.
Reliance may be made in
innumerable ways, all of which could refer
exclusively to the contract.
Id.,

at 275, citing Randall

v.

Tracy

Collins

& Trust

6 Utah 2d 18, 23, 305 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1956);
also

Co.,
see

2 Corbin on Contracts , § 425 (1950) (performance

must be in pursuance of the contract and in reasonable
28

reliance thereon); 37 C.J.S., Statute

of Frauds, § 250

(1943) (part performance to be sufficient to take the
case out of the statute must consist of clear and
definite acts of the party relying thereon).
As

mentioned

above,

§

25-5-8

U.C.A.

(1953),

provides that part performance may remove a contract from
Young v.

the bar of the statute of frauds.
P.2d

78, 80

(Utah

1983).

"The

Moore,

doctrine

of

663
part

performance in this State has not been confined to a
fixed, inflexible formula."
supra.,

Id.

In Holmgren

Brothers,

the Court stated:

The doctrine of part performance, in the
State of Utah, has not been reduced to a
formula . . . Thus, decisions of this court
do not stay the hand of equity in the
equitable situations created by oral contracts
for the transfer of an interest in land, but
the statute is preserved and remains to serve
its purpose -- the prevention of fraud and
injustice.
Id.

at 613-14. Furthermore, the statute of frauds has no

application to fully executed contracts, and matters
arising out of fully executed contracts may be enforced.
Kerr v.

Hillyard,

Greenwood v. Jackson,

51 Utah 364, 170 P. 981 (1918);
102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d 282 (1942).
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In the present case, Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant
Krogman entered into an oral agreement whereby Defendant
Krogman

would

purchase

Plaintiff Donohue.

a

1986

Kenworth

truck

from

While this agreement involved the

sale of goods and not realty, it was clearly taken out of
Utah's Statute of Frauds based on the doctrines of part
performance and fully executed contracts.
terms

of

the

required

to

$17,263.29

oral

agreement,

make

payments

together

with

Defendant

on
all

Under the

the

Krogman

truck

repairs,

was

totalling

maintenance,

licensing, insurance, and all other necessities required
by the truck.

(Transcript, pp. 156 & 164).

Defendant Krogman made all payments, as specified by
the

Plaintiff

Donohue's agent.

Donohue,

to

Mr.

Mouille,

Plaintiff

(Transcript, pp. 97, 154, 156, & 164).

In February of 1993, Defendant Krogman paid the pay-off
total of $5,763.29 to Mr. Mouille, Plaintiff Donohue's
agent.

(Transcript, p. 158).

Although Mr. Mouille

failed to forward that amount to Associates at that time,
he continued to make monthly payments to Associates.
(Transcript, pp. 105-106).

In July, 1993, Mr. Mouille
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told Plaintiff Donohue that he was prepared to make the
last payment on the truck to Associates so that the title
could be released to Defendant Krogman. (Transcript, pp.
106-107).

At this point, for the first time, Plaintiff

Donohue told Mr. Mouille that he would not honor the
contract nor transfer the title to Defendant Krogman.
(Transcript, pp. 106-107).
Defendant Krogman fully performed his duties under
the oral agreement, and therefore, Utah's Statute of
Frauds

has

contract.

no

application

to

this

fully

executed

Even if this Court finds that the oral

contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant was not
fully performed, it must find that Defendant Krogman's
partial

performance

effectively

took

the

agreement

outside Utah's Statute of Frauds.
First, the oral contract and its terms were clear
and definite; second, the acts done by the parties in
performance on the contract were equally clear and
definite; and third, the acts by Defendant Krogman were
done in reliance on the contract.

Defendant Krogman's

acts in reliance were such that they would not have been
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performed had the contract not existed, and the failure
of Plaintiff Donohue to perform would result in fraud on
Defendant

Krogman,

who

relied

existence of the oral contract.

exclusively

on

the

Furthermore, under the

Utah Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-8 U.C.A.

(1953), this

Court has the power to compel the specific performance of
the

oral

agreement

between

the

Plaintiff

and

the

Defendant due to Defendant Krogman?s part performance.
Appellant argues that the oral agreement between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant should constitute a promise
to answer for the debt of another because the District
Court found that Defendant Krogman would be responsible
for making Mr. Mouille f s payments to Associates.
assertion

is

wholly

inconsistent

with

the

This

District

Court's Findings of Fact which state: "1. Commencing
December, 1991 through January and February of 1992,
Plaintiff and Defendants Krogman and Mouille entered into
an oral agreement whereby Defendant Krogman agreed to pay
$1,000.00 per month to Associates which represents the
amount owing Associates by Plaintiff for purchase of the
Kenworth.

(Record, pp. 172-173).
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Neither the Record nor the evidence presented at
trial suggest that the Defendant contracted to serve as
a surety for Mr. Mouille.

In fact, the testimony

confirms that the Plaintiff sought a buyer for his
Kenworth truck. Thus, Plaintiff Donohue entered into an
agreement with Defendant Krogman to make the payments to
Associates

through

Mr.

Mouille.

Furthermore,

the

Plaintiff contracted separately with Mr. Mouille for the
$9,500 which Mr. Mouille owed the Plaintiff under an
earlier agreement.7
Finally, Appellant argues that the agreement between
the Plaintiff and the Defendant is barred by Utah's
Statute

of

Frauds

because

it

could

not

have

been

performed within one year. Whether an oral agreement can
be performed in one year is a question of fact. M&S

Constr.

& Engineering

Co. v. Clearfield

State

Bank, 19

The District Court found: "6. The oral contract further
provided that Defendant Mouille would remain liable to
Plaintiff for $500.00 a month, during the term of the
contract, which represented the amount of the original lease
agreement over and above the $1,000.00 owed monthly to
Associates." (Record, p. 172).
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Utah 2d 86, 426 P.2d 225 (1967).

If an oral agreement

might be performed within one year, courts will enforce
that

agreement

Johnson
Zlon's

v.

outside of Utah's

Johnson,

Serv.

Corp.

982 (1961);

31 Utah

408; 88 P.

v. Danielson,

Thompson

v.

Statute

of Frauds.
230

(1906);

12 Utah 2d 369, 366 P. 2d

Whitney,

20 Utah 1, 57 P. 429

(1910).
Appellant argues that the agreement did not contain
a pre-payment provision for payments on the truck.

It is

interesting to note that the agreement also failed to
mention anything regarding a pre-payment penalty.

Thus,

Defendant Krogman could have paid off the truck any time
within a year of the contract.
case,

the

District

Court

Based on the facts of the

correctly

concluded

that

Plaintiff's statute of frauds defense is inapplicable in
this case.

(Record, p. 174).

III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

A.
The

District

Standard
Court

of

Review

correctly

dismissed

the

Plaintiff's Complaint because it found that the parties
34

entered into a valid oral agreement for the sale of the
Kenworth truck. As previously mentioned, the decision of
the trial court is entitled to a presumption of validity.
Oberhansly,

572 P.2d at 1386. Appellate courts will not

overturn a trial court's factual findings when such
findings are supported by substantial
evidence.

Cambelt

Int'l

Corp.,

and competent

745 P.2d

at 1242.

Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.

UT R. CIV. P. 52(a).

Although the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint sought
damages from Defendant Krogman, the District Court found
that there was no cause of action with respect to
Plaintiff's

claims

as

embodied

within

Plaintiff's

Complaint. (Record, p. 173). The District Court further
found that Defendant Krogman was the legal owner of the
Kenworth truck and was entitled to the Kenworth title
upon payment to the Plaintiff of the sum of $1,125.00.
(Record, pp. 173-174).

The District Court's factual

findings were based on substantial and competent evidence
and cannot be overturned unless clearly erroneous.

B. Proper Dismissal

of Plaintiff's
35

Complaint

At trial, Defendant Krogman presented substantial
and competent evidence of the existence of an oral
agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

The

District Court found, based on substantial and conclusive
testimonial evidence given by Defendant Krogman, Mr.
Mouille, and Mr. Rice, that an oral agreement existed
between the parties.

As mentioned above, substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might

accept as adequate to support

Johnson-Bowles,

a conclusion."

829 P.2d at 107.

Appellant contends that all reasonable minds would
conclude that the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
against the Defendant
between

the

accepted

parties.

the

as no oral agreement existed
The

Defendant's

District
substantial

Court

properly

and

relevant

evidence as adequate to support a conclusion of the
existence of an oral agreement.

The District Court, in

dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint, conclusively found
that all reasonable minds could not conclude that the
Plaintiff proved his case by a preponderance of the
evidence.

Moreover, the

substantial

36

and

competent

evidence presented at trial, proved that an oral contract
existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, under
which, Defendant Krogman was rightfully entitled to the
1986 Kenworth truck.
CONCLUSION
The

District

Court

properly

found

that

an

enforceable oral agreement existed between the Plaintiff
and Defendant. Furthermore, the District Court correctly
dismissed

the

Plaintiff's

Complaint

based

on

the

substantial and competent evidence presented at trial.
The Appellee respectfully requests this Court to affirm
the District Court's finding that an oral agreement
existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
Appellee respectfully requests his costs on appeal.
DATED this f *2' day of Septenjbor, 1995.

*ANpALL L. SKEEN
:orney for
Defendant-Appellee
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before?
A.

No, I'm sure I haven't.

Q.

To this day?

I mean is it your

testimony that this is the first time you've ever
seen this document, this very minute?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you ever been informed that a

lease agreement existed between Mr. Donohue and
Mr. Mouille pertaining to the 1986 Kenworth
tractor?
A.

I didn't know personally there was a

written agreement.
agreement.

I knew they had some kind of an

I didn't know whether it was verbal or

written.
Q.

When did you first become aware that

there was some kind of an agreement between
Mr. Donohue and Mr. Mouille?
A.

On the Kenworth?

Q.

Yes, sir.

A.

Oh, I knew that when I started driving

for him.

Like I say, when I hired on with U.S.

Load Service, John was around there, and there was
some talk that this was the guy that owned the
truck or was selling it to U.S. Load Service or
whatever.
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Q.

Who told you about this agreement?

A,

I don't know.

It might have been

either Donohue or Mouille, I'm not sure.
Q.

Okay.

So as early as February of

ninety -A.

One.

Q.

One, thank you, you were aware that

some form of agreement existed between Mr. Donohue
and Mr. Mouille pertaining to the 1986 Kenworth?
A.

Yes.

Q.

As I understand your testimony, you

started using the 1986 Kenworth in February of '92
-- excuse me, January of '92; is that correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Now, between the time of February of

'91 and January of '92, did you ever ask
Mr. Donohue or Mr. Mouille for a copy of the
agreement?
A.

No, I never did.

Q.

Did you know whether or not the

agreement was a lease agreement or a sales
agreement between Mr. Donohue and Mr. Mouille?
A.

I assumed it was a sales.

I'd heard

that mentioned, that John told me he was buying the
truck or something.

You know, it was really none
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of my business.
Q.

I didn't pay much attention.

Well, did you do anything to

investigation what type of contractual

relationship

existed between Mr. Donohue and Mr. Mouille
pertaining to the Kenworth tractor?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

I take it there came a point in time

when there was some discussion about you taking
over the ownership of the Kenworth tractor?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Is that correct?

A.

(Witness nodded)

Q.

I'd like to find out when was the first

occasion that this issue arose at all.
A.

It would have been after I quit driving

for U.S. Load Service in December of '91, between
then and January 3rd of '92.

Because basically I

was out of a job.
Q.

Did you approach anyone or did someone

approach you relative to this Kenworth tractor?
A.

I was approached.

Q.

By whom?

A.

Jean Mouille mentioned it originally,

asked me if I might be interested in taking over
payments.
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